The Ethics of Nudge by Bovens, Luc
 1 
The Ethics of Nudge 1 
 
Luc Bovens 
London School of Economics and Political Science 





Till Grüne-Yanoff and S.O. Hansson (2008) Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, 
Economics and Psychology, Berlin and New York: Springer, Theory and Decision Library A, 
Chapter 10.   
 
 
In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a 
position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’.  Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the 
political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic.  In the US, 
they have advised  Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David 
Cameron’s camp. (Chakrabortty, 2008)  I will consider the following questions.  What is Nudge?  How 
is it different from social advertisement?  Does Nudge induce genuine preference change?  Does 
Nudge build moral character?  Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to 
subliminal images to reach policy objectives?  And what are the moral constraints on Nudge?  
 
1. The Paradigm Cases 
 
I take Cafeteria and Save More Tomorrow to be paradigm cases of what constitutes a T&S-style 
Nudge, as these cases are repeatedly discussed in their writings.  (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003: 1159-60 
and 1164-66; T&S, 2003: 175 and 177; T&S, 2008: 1-3 and 112-115)    
In Cafeteria, the goal is to induce students to choose a healthier diet.  Studies show that 
individuals are prone to select items placed earlier and at eye level in a line of food items.  So the 
school’s management might try to affect students’ diets by rearranging the display of the food items so 
as to make it more likely that the healthy food items are selected.   
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In Save More Tomorrow, the goal is to make employees invest more in their pension fund 
savings.  Employees are asked well ahead of time whether they are willing to commit next year’s raise 
towards their pension funds.  They are much more willing to agree to this than when they are asked to 
do so after they have received pay checks with the raises included.  This exploits two psychological 
mechanisms.  First, there is the Endowment Effect.  People tend to find it much harder to part with 
something once they have it in hand than to forego it when they have never had it in hand.  A 
description of this psychological mechanism can be found in David Hume’s Treatise2 and Adam 
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments3.    Second, people tend to find it much easier to show 
strength of will when it comes to future than to present costs and benefits. think of Augustine’s 
Prayer—make me chaste, but not yet. What explains the greater willingness to commit to a future loss 
of income to savings rather than a present loss is a combination of both of these psychological 
mechanisms.  
Nudge is replete with examples that have a structure that is similar to these two cases.  What 
these examples have in common is a manipulation of people’s choices via the choice architecture, i.e. 
the way in which the choices are presented to them.  This works in the following way.  Choices are 
structured such that some psychological mechanism leads people toward options that are either 
thought to be in their own best interest or thought to be in society’s best interest.  In all cases of 
Nudge, if the choice situation had not been so structured, then people would be less prone to make the 
choice that is either in their own or in society’s interest.   
 
2. Social Advertisement 
 
There is a more familiar type of intervention that the government employs to affect our behaviour.  In 
social advertisement campaigns, we are made aware of the dangers of drug usage, the problem of 
domestic violence, the threat of AIDS etc.  How are such campaigns different from Nudge?   
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Social advertisement affects our choices by providing us with information or by affecting our 
emotions.  Sometimes we learn things that we did not know before and change our behaviour.  For 
example, an addict may change her drug habits after being informed of the death rate associated with 
cocaine usage.  Other times there is no new information offered, but the situation is presented with 
such force that we change our behaviour.  For example, pictures of domestic abuse may induce a wife 
beater to seek professional help.   
T&S do discuss cases of framing in social advertisement. (2008: 180-2)  For example, social 
advertisement that conveys the percentage of people who are registered as organ donors is more 
effective than if it were to convey the percentage of people who are not registered.  The information 
provided is the same, but people are more likely to change their behaviour when the information is 
positively framed.4  So social advertisement can be a form of Nudge, but not all social advertisement is 
Nudge.  So what makes Nudge different?   
 
3. Rationality and Autonomy 
 
T&S write that their ‘basic source of information’ is ‘the emerging science of choice, consisting of 
careful research by social scientists over the past four decades... [that] has raised serious questions 
about the rationality of many judgments and decisions that people make’ (2008: 7).  So one defining 
characteristic of Nudge, as opposed to social advertisement that does not qualify as Nudge, could be 
that some pattern of irrationality is being exploited.  The psychological mechanisms that are exploited 
in Cafeteria and in Save More Tomorrow typically work better in the dark.  If we tell students that the 
order of the food in the Cafeteria is rearranged for dietary purposes, then the intervention may be less 
successful.  If we explain the endowment effect to employees, they may be less inclined to Save More 
Tomorrow. And even if we try to affect our own behaviour by means of these mechanisms, then our 
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efforts will be most effective when our knowledge of having done so is latent (or when we simply are 
able to forget).   
The following oft-cited example illustrates this well.  People are prone to add an expensive car 
radio to their newly bought car.  But if the car radio is not available on the day of the purchase and they 
are offered the very same car radio the very next day, then they would never dream of spending this 
kind of money on a car radio.  (Savage 1954: 103)  Now once you point this out to them, they typically 
try to self-correct.  They refrain from buying the expensive radio at the earlier point of time.  Or, they 
may take this to be an argument for spending the money the next day—they remind themselves that 
they were perfectly happy to buy the radio on the day of purchase.  It is not clear what direction they 
will take the argument, but at least, they will strive for less inconsistency in their actions.   
There is something less than fully autonomous about the patterns of decision-making that 
Nudge taps into.  When we are subject to the mechanisms that are studied in ‘the science of choice’, 
then we are not fully in control of our actions.5  When I am presented with full knowledge, then I tend to 
self-correct my agency.  It seems that I was acting on a rule with which I cannot identify.  What is so 
special about the first available item that I would favour it over later items?  What is so special about 
having something in hand that would make it so much more valuable compared to the moment before I 
have it in hand?  Clearly these are cases of not letting my actions be guided by principles that I can 
underwrite.  And in as much, these actions are non-autonomous.  Can they be said to be irrational?  
They can in so far as what is driving my action does not constitute a reason for my action—i.e. it is not 
a feature of the action that I endorse as a feature that makes the action desirable. 
This brings us to the question with which we ended the last section.  Why is at least some 
social advertisement different from Nudge?  When social advertisement provides us with information 
that gives us a reason to change our behaviour then the intended effect is fully autonomous decision-
making.  If it does not provide us with new information, but increases the saliency of certain reasons 
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then the intended effect is again fully autonomous decision-making.  And in this respect there is no 
reliance on the science of choice that raises questions about the rationality of our decision-making.  Of 
course, these kinds of distinctions are much less clear in the real world.  If a social advertiser frames 
the information in a particular manner that is known to have a greater impact on our decision-making—
the more so if we are not made cognisant hereof—then we bring in elements of Nudge again.  
Reasons in support of (or against) the targeted agency and the causal mechanisms that raise (or 
diminish) the occurrence of the targeted agency mix together in social advertisement; in so far as 
social advertisement relies on the latter it has a bit of Nudge in it.   
 
4. What type of agency does Nudge aim to correct?   
 
I will distinguish between six types of agency that can be made the subject of a Nudge.   
 
i. Ignorance. If the government sets a default for retirement plans, they may do so for the 
same reason that a medical doctor might recommend a treatment.  We typically have little 
knowledge of the matter at hand.  We have a clear goal, viz. to be well off in old age or to 
recover from an ailment.  But the route to this goal requires special expertise, which we lack.  
So it is lack of knowledge that hampers us in laying out the steps towards realising our goals.   
 
ii. Inertia.  It may be the case that we do have sufficient knowledge, but somehow inertia gets 
the best of us.  We are absorbed in our daily activities and simply put off filling out the forms 
until we forget.  In this case a default option kicking in for the lazy or forgetful may be welcome.   
 
iii. Akrasia. Consider our paradigm cases again.  Typically we know quite well that our 
consumption of cream puffs is not conducive towards overall health.  We know quite well that 
we are putting too little money into our retirement funds.  What stands in the way is weakness 
of the will (akrasia).  We are weak-willed in choosing the proper steps towards our long-term 
goals.  By structuring the choice situation it becomes easier to correct for such weak-willed 
actions, because temptation will have less of a pull on us.  
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iv. Queasiness.   In post-mortem organ donations, the culprit is not lack of knowledge or 
weakness of the will.  Many of us have no objection to becoming organ donors.  It may be 
inertia, but it could also be queasiness, which prevents us from becoming donors.  We are 
perfectly fine with our organs being used post-mortem for transplantation, but we do not want 
to entertain such matters in decision-making.  There is an emotional cost in making the 
decision of becoming a post-mortem organ donor.        
 
v. Exception.  Suppose that particular choices by people with a particular profile tend to 
engender feelings of regret, whereas alternative choices tend to induce greater ex post 
satisfaction.  Let us suppose that there is ample evidence for this in empirical research.  For 
example, we could think of sex change surgeries, abortions, divorces, teenage sex, or what 
have you.  It may well be the case that it holds true as a statistical claim that people who 
choose some such options typically experience feelings of regret afterwards.  Of course there 
is a reference class problem.  It may be the case that for the subgroup to which I belong, 
suitably defined, this tendency is false.  For example, although most transgendered people 
experience regret after a sex change surgery, the subgroup of transgendered people of which I 
am a member (say, female, engaged in a relationship with an accepting partner,...) does not.  
But suppose that for the narrowest social group for whom we can obtain meaningful results 
and of which I am a member, this tendency holds.  Then I could still claim that, though most 
people display such feelings of regrets, I, for one, am confident that I will not.  And I may be 
correct in my claim.  
 
vi. Social Benefits.  It may well be the case that a particular individual choice is not socially 
beneficial.  There are many such examples.  I may see no benefit whatsoever in giving to 
charity.  In a Tragedy of the Commons, society may be better off if I decide to refrain from, say, 
adding a fishing boat to over-fished waters or drilling for oil in an oil well that is already quite 
depleted.  But unless I am being compensated or find alternative employment, I may be worse 
off.  In a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma, society would have been better off if we had all 
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cooperated, but I would have been worse off if I had cooperated rather than defected.  In all 
such cases, a bit of Nudge might be meaningful to realise a socially beneficial outcome, but it 
may well be at the cost of my own welfare.   
 
In the real world, these distinctions are less pronounced and there are many grey cases.  Some cases 
of Inertia may be instances of convenient forgetfulness that are not altogether different from Akrasia.  
Ignorance may be intentional because we wish to forego making hard decisions and in this respect 
such cases may not be altogether different from Inertia and Queasiness.  And I may simply adjust my 
overall preferences when I come to learn about the statistical evidence or social benefits and then the 
only thing that would block my ability to act in a particular case is Akrasia.  But the existence of these 
mixed cases does not invalidate the exercise of distinguishing between ideal cases, which will prove 
useful when thinking about preference change and the moral permissibility of Nudge.  
 
5. Preference Change6 
 
Let us start with Exception and Social Benefits.  In these cases, I am being Nudged in the direction of 
agency which I do not believe to be in my interest.  For instance, suppose I believe upon reflection that 
there is no need to increase my pension savings, but the Save-More-Tomorrow Nudge did induce me 
to do so.  What can we say about my preferences when I decide to invest my future raise into my 
pension fund whereas I would not have done so after the raise had been in place?  Did I undergo a 
preference change?   
In one respect the answer is yes—I revealed my preference through my choice.  What has 
changed is that I have a preference for dedicating a greater percentage of my income to my pension 
fund here and now, which I never had before.  In another respect the answer is no.  Have I become a 
more frugal person?  Not really.  In a way my action is aberrant.  It is not well integrated with my overall 
preference structure—i.e. with my conception of the good, with what I take to be good for me all things 
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considered.  I am like the fox and the sour grapes.  The fox loses his appetite7 for the grapes that he 
cannot reach.  Even if he does not want these grapes anymore, he remains the kind of fox who likes 
juicy summer fruits in general.  So his preference over the token action of eating these very grapes 
does not cohere well with his preferences over the type of actions of eating juicy summer fruits.  
Similarly, my preference for the token action of dedicating a greater percentage of my income to my 
pension fund does not cohere well with my preference for actions that are non-frugal in character.  It is 
no different than signing the lease for a timeshare in the Virgin Isles with a clever salesperson in 
charge—in some respect, I do want it, but in another respect, I do not, since it does not fit in with my 
overall preference structure.  We choose on the background of a fragmented self.  In answering the 
question whether we do or do not want to buy into the Save More Tomorrow scheme, whether the fox 
does or does not want the grapes, or whether we do or do not want the timeshare, a gloss is needed—
in some respect, yes, in another respect no. 
Of course coherence may be regained by making changes in my preference structure at large.  
The fox may well turn away from juicy summer fruits in general after a few bad experiences with fruit 
that is beyond his reach.  Similarly, I may acquire a taste for frugal actions after a few Nudges in this 
direction.  There are various mechanisms that may bring this about.  I may come to appreciate such 
actions through discovering hitherto unknown attractive features.  I may become habituated in 
Aristotelian style—my feelings may simply shift by repeatedly acting frugally or eating healthy foods.  I 
may come to self-identify as a person who acts frugally or eats healthy foods on grounds of cognitive 
dissonance.  All such mechanisms could be successful in bringing about preference shifts over action 
types and then my newly acquired preference is genuine.   
What can we say about Nudge in cases of Ignorance, Inertia, Akrasia, of Queasiness?  In these 
cases Nudge steers us in the direction of what we consider to be in line with our overall preference 
structure.  Our initial preferences over action tokens do not cohere well with our overall preferences.  
So now we are Nudged in a direction that restores coherence between our actions and our overall 
preference structure.  Is this a genuine preference change?   
                                               
7
 This is the preference change interpretation of the fable, which we find in Elster (1983: 123)  This 
interpretation differs from a case of self-deception in which the fox would turn away and say that these 
grapes are too sour, are unripe, or what have you.  This would be a case of a belief change induced by 
considerations of feasibility rather than by evidence for the proposition at hand.   
 9 
There is another lesson to be learned from the fox.  Suppose that the fox tells us upon sincere 
introspection that he does not want the grapes anymore.  Suppose that he even changes his overall 
preference structure and turns up his nose for juicy summer fruits in general.  But now suppose that 
we lower the vine for the fox.  Would he reconsider?  Suppose that he would, maybe not immediately, 
but after encountering a few low-hanging bunches of grapes, he would be at it eating grapes again.  
Then we would need to qualify the claim that the fox changed his preferences.  Again, we would add a 
gloss—we would say that his preference change was too short-lived to qualify as a genuine preference 
change.  Similarly we would be hesitant to say that the Nudge made us prefer to dedicate a greater 
percentage of our income to our pension fund, when we would decide differently without the aid of 
some clever choice architecture.  Even though we may have an overall preference to be more frugal, 
we can hardly be said to genuinely prefer to dedicate a greater percentage of our income towards our 
pension fund next year when this type of action is not resilient without the aid of Nudges.  
As before, it may be the case that a few Nudges provide me with a taste for frugal actions and 
that it becomes easier for me to act in accordance with my overall preference structure, also in the 
absence of clever choice architectures.  Then the non-resilience objection drops out and the 
preference change becomes genuine.         
Let me sum up by making the point by means of Cafeteria.  Suppose that a Nudge succeeds in 
making me take the healthy snack.  Did it then induce a preference in me for the healthy snack?  In 
some respect, yes—I revealed my preference through my choice.  But this may need a gloss.  
Suppose that I am actually the person who values the life style of the glutton.  Then in another respect, 
I do not genuinely prefer the healthy snack.  This case maps onto the cases of Exception and Social 
Benefits.  Or suppose that I do prefer a healthy life style, but I continue to take ice-cream under non-
Nudge condition.  Then you would look at me strangely if I were to proclaim that I genuinely prefer the 
healthy snack when I am placed under Nudge conditions.  You would point out to me that I just took 
the healthy snack because of the choice architecture—I do not genuinely prefer the healthy snack.  
This case maps onto the cases of Ignorance, Inertia, Akrasia, and Queasiness.  However, if 
adjustments to the overall preference structure are made in Exception and Social Benefits or resilience 
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is gained in Ignorance, ..., Queasiness, then the preference change becomes a genuine preference 
change and we no longer need glosses.8         
       
 
6. Does Nudge build Moral Character?   
 
We continue with cases of Ignorance, Inertia, Akrasia, and Queasiness.  It is a lack of self-control that 
blocks us from acting in accordance with our overall preference structure.  So when we are Nudged in 
the direction of actions that we take to be in our interest all things considered, does this build moral 
character?  Does it increase our capacity for self-control?       
The folk singer Karen Dalton once said that she sang softly because she wanted people to 
listen to her.  This strikes us as paradoxical.  Certainly people are more likely to listen when you raise 
your voice.  Indeed, this is the expectation of the short-term effect.  But the long-term effect may be 
precisely reversed.  Think of a grade school teacher who is prone to raise her voice.  This may be 
effective in the short term, but she may have to raise her voice more and more and the overall effect 
may be that more children would have listened to her had she never raised her voice to begin with.  
Similarly, there is research showing that the death penalty has a deterrence effect in that the rate of 
pardon by the governor correlates with the rate of violent crime in subsequent years. (Gittings and 
Mocan 2003)  This is consistent with the brutalisation effect—capital punishment may contribute to a 
more violent culture and may increase violent crime in the long run.  
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Now it may be the case that repeated Nudging in public health and pension funds may have 
short-term positive effects at best.  Nudging may not create sustainable effects on people’s behaviour 
for the long-term; as time goes on, the level of Nudging required to retain this effect may increase.  
Just as Karen Dalton did not want to raise her voice, knowing full well that some people would zone 
out, we should not be lured by the short-term success of Nudging either.  To warrant long-term 
success, we should let people make their own decisions while providing minimal aid.  My point is that 
short-term success of Nudge may be consistent with long-term failure. The long-term effect of Nudge 
may be infantilisation, i.e. decreased responsibility in matters regarding one’s own welfare.  
But of course things ain’t necessarily so.  Cognitive dissonance, habituation, acquiring a taste 
for the good-making features in Nudged actions may bring about long-term preference change as well.  
More people may come to adjust their overall dietary habits (and not only in the Cafeteria setting) or 
become more prudent in general (and not only in the Save More Tomorrow scheme.)  This brings us 
back to the question of whether Nudge induces genuine preference change.  When we come to 
acquire a taste for the Nudged actions, then the effects will be more broad-ranging and long-lasting.   
At the end of the day, different people will be affected in different ways and it is an empirical 
question whether there does exist something like the infantilisation effect, just like it is an empirical 
question whether there exist something like the brutalisation effect of capital punishment.  My only aim 
here is to point out that, just as a study of the (short-term) deterrence effects of capital punishment by 
means of time-series analysis is not the last word, a study of the (short-term) success of a particular 
Nudge is not the last word either.  Granted, brutalisation and infantilisation effects are difficult to study 
through empirical testing.  It does not suffice to do cross-population studies and to point to the 
correlation between capital punishment and the number of executions on the one hand and the rate of 
violent crime on the other hand, since the causal direction is unclear.  Counter to the brutalisation 
effect, it may well be the case that high rate of violent crimes is the cause of the institution and the 
prevalence of capital punishment, rather than vice versa.  The same problem would occur if we were to 
find a correlation between some measure of responsibility and paternalistic policies.  Counter to the 
infantilisation effect, it may well be the case that the low measure of responsibility is the cause of the 
institution and the prevalence of paternalistic policies rather than vice versa.   
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7. Who is Nudging?  
 
It matters a great deal who is doing the Nudging.  Let us start with a case in which I set up a Nudge to 
constrain my own behaviour.  This is an example of sophisticated choice. (McClennen, 1990: 12)   I 
may force myself to decide on increased pension-fund contributions earlier rather than later because I 
know that it is my only hope to commit a reasonable amount.  I don’t think that there is much to object 
here.  Now some strong-willed people consider it to be wrong for me to decide, say, not to bring any 
liquor in the home.  They seem to believe that we should educate ourselves so as to become resolute 
choosers, who are able to commit just as much to their pension funds after receiving a raise as before 
receiving it and who are able to drink just as little, whether there is liquor in the home or not.  But let us 
bracket such ideals of perfectionism.  As long as we are self-legislating, there seems to be little to 
object to in engaging a Nudge.  
But now let us go one step further.  Suppose that I choose a nudging partner and consciously 
or unconsciously take his or her nudging to be a good-making feature.  Or suppose that I choose to 
work in a self-professed paternalistic company.  In either case, it seems that I have little to object to 
when the fridge or the line with food items is carefully arranged so that I am more likely to take the 
healthy options.   
But this brings us to the actual concern with Nudge as a social policy instrument.  What if a 
majority elects a government with a nanny-state platform?  Do they have a democratic mandate to 
Nudge?  What about the minority who does not want the government to interfere with their preference 




Without going into the empirical details, let us suppose that the use of subliminal images could actually 
bring about preference change.  Now typically the use of such devices makes people extremely 
nervous.  Suppose  that the government starts a public health campaign to reduce obesity.  Let there 
be a social group with problematic dietary habits.  Research shows that there is a high density of 
viewers from this social group for a particular TV programme.  So we decide to splice pictures of happy 
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carrot-eaters into this programme as subliminal images.  T&S object to this practice because of the 
lack of transparency (2008: 244-5).  But then suppose that the government simply announces that it 
will combat social problems by means of subliminal images.  T&S object that also this would not 
suffice, because ‘manipulation of this kind is objectionable precisely because it is invisible and thus 
impossible to monitor’ (2008: 246).  
 So how is this any different from Cafeteria?  We need to make a distinction between type 
interference transparency and token interference transparency.  It is one thing for the government to 
say that they will be using certain types of psychological mechanisms to solve social problems.  This is 
type interference transparency—the government is transparent about how it will try to interfere with our 
agency.  But then there is no difference between Nudges and subliminal images—the government can 
announce that it will Nudge and that it will use subliminal images.  Yet T&S support the former and 
object to the latter.  So type interference transparency is not enough.     
I take it that T&S also wish to have token interference transparency.  How does Nudge differ 
from subliminal images?  Being exposed to a particular image at a particular time is a token 
interference by means of  a subliminal image.  When we are affected by such a token interference, 
there is no way that we could notice (blocking the use of special equipment).  But if we are being 
Nudged, it is possible to recognise here and now that the food is arranged in a particular manner, that 
the pension savings forms are sent early to facilitate saving etc.  So in a Nudge, it is possible to 
recognise each token interference.       
 So does this mean we need to put up a billboard next to the food line stating: “Research shows 
that people are more prone to take food items displayed earlier rather than further down the line. Many 
of our customers are trying to lose weight but find it difficult to do so.  To help them, we have arranged 
the snacks in the food line with healthier items displayed earlier so that they are more likely to choose 
these items.”  The problem is that these techniques do work best in the dark.  So the more actual 
token interference transparency we demand, the less effective these techniques are.  But it may just 
be sufficient that there is in principle token interference transparency.  A watchful person would be able 
to identify the intention of the choice architecture and she could blow the whistle if she judges that the 
government is overstepping its mandate.  This in principle token interference transparency is not 
possible for subliminal images.  In giving the government a mandate to use subliminal images we 
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would be signing a blank check and could only hope that they will not be abusing their power and 
splice in ads for the incumbent in the next election.   
In summary, subliminal images are deemed impermissible because they do not satisfy in 
principle token interference transparency, whereas T&S-style Nudges do pass this requirement.   But 
then are we not confident that there are some watchdogs with sophisticated equipment keeping an eye 
on the government?  Certainly, but I think that we find it important that also we ourselves could decide 
to become watchful and unmask any manipulation.  In the democratic process we may give the 
government a mandate to engage in certain types of Nudges.  But then we wish to respect the right of 
minorities who do not appreciate this type of manipulation.  To safeguard their interests, we stipulate 
that every Nudge should be such that it is in principle possible for everyone who is watchful to unmask 
the manipulation.   
        
9. The Moral Permissibility of Nudge 
 
I have pointed to a number of issues that are relevant when we judge the permissibility of a particular 
Nudge.   
First, it is less worrisome when the Nudge brings our agency in line with our overall 
preferences, as in Ignorance, Inertia, Akrasia and Queasiness than when the projected agency is not 
in line with our overall preferences, as in Exception and Social Benefits.   
Second, it is less desirable when a Nudge is local and leaves us with a fragmented self.  We 
become incomprehensible to ourselves—why did we not act in line with our overall preferences or why 
is this kind of agency not resilient under non-Nudge conditions?  We can avoid such a fragmented self 
if our Nudging brings about change in our general preference structure or change in our agency that 
continues to hold under non-Nudge conditions.  But there is a tension here.  Some will undoubtedly be 
even more worried if Nudge brings about massive changes in our preferences through psychological 
mechanisms such as habituation, cognitive dissonance etc.  Fragmentation avoidance comes at the 
cost of even more non-autonomous preference change.  This may be worrisome in cases like 
Exception and Social Benefits.  (See f. 8.)     
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Third, Nudge is less desirable when it creates a people who have become incapable of taking 
their lives in their own hands and to make autonomous changes in their agency to make it fit in with 
their overall preference structure.  Such long-term infantilisation effects are difficult to assess 
empirically but it is nonetheless a concern that does not go away.  Adam Smith (Part VI, Sect. III; 143-
5) thought that adversity was the best school to develop the respectable virtue of self-command.  The 
cost of Nudge may be that we forego the chance to gain the virtue of self-command.  
Fourth, the less control we retain over being Nudged, the more problematic it is.  If we choose 
to put ourselves into a situation that is rich with Nudges, then we have little to complain about.  But 
does this type of consent extend to a democratic mandate to the government to be Nudged?  I have 
argued that Nudges must be transparent in principle at the level of each token Nudge, in order to 
ensure that everyone can unmask the manipulation if they wish to do so.  This protects the rights of the 
minorities who do not wish to be so manipulated and it keeps a check on the government.     
  There are many other factors that enter into the permissibility of Nudge.   Let me just flag a few.  
Advertisement for products that do not increase welfare may use all kinds of Nudge style techniques 
and the government may be fighting a losing battle against, say, obesity, if it cannot access the same 
arsenal of techniques.  Furthermore, governments commonly set up quasi-markets to increase 
efficiency in the provision of public goods.  Citizens are bombarded by technical information from 
competing providers.  Securing health insurance should not be as complicated as choosing a cell-
phone.  If the government institutes such quasi-markets then it also has the responsibility to navigate 
people through them which may involve more or less gentle Nudging.  Finally, the more urgent the 
problem that a Nudge is trying to tackle, the less it meets with qualms.  Instituting Save for Tomorrow 
may be more acceptable in the US than in South East Asia, considering differential saving rates.  
Instituting Cafeteria may be more acceptable in Chicago than in Paris, considering differential obesity 
rates.  And, no doubt, in assessing the permissibility of particular Nudges, many more considerations 
that are idiosyncratic to the case at hand will emerge and each case will need to be assessed on its 
own merits. 
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